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  This paper presents an empirical investigation to study the relationship between the liquidity 
and the reward of board of directors on 136 selected firms listed on Tehran Stock Exchange 
over the period 2007-2011.The study considers nine different factors including return on assets 
(ROA), return on equities (ROE), Q-Tobin, changes of ROA and ROE, etc.  In our study, there 
is a direct relationship between firm sizes with reward of board's directors. In addition, there is 
a direct relationship between changes of ROE with reward of board's directors. Moreover, there 
is  a  direct  relationship  between  changes  of  operational  cash  flow  with reward  of  board's 
directors. Finally, there is a direct relationship between changes of Q-Tobin ratio with reward of 
board's directors but the relationship was reverse for some years. These evidences confirm that 
there was a meaningful relationship between rewarding board of directors and share liquidity.  
         © 2014 Growing Science Ltd.  All rights reserved. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One  of  the  main  functions  of  financial  markets  especially  shares  exchange  is  cost  reduction, 
acceleration, and facilitation in the process of changing financial assets to liquidity or vice versa, that 
is so-called Liquid. Liquid is the susceptibility of fast buying and selling considerable amount of 
exchange with the least effects on  the  price. This matter draws  the researchers' attention  in  both 
individual and marketing aspects of stock exchange over the past few years. In order to examine the 
relationship  between  liquid  and  liquid  index  in  this  study,  optimized  allocation  of  resources  is 
considered  as  the  main  aspect  of  the  process.  Liquid  capability  shows financial  assets  proximity 
(nearness) to cash. Liquid capability of the financial property via its alteration capability to cash is 
being evaluated in every time without imposing loss (with nothing out of pocket). One can change 
negotiable exchange into cash (payment) any time via efficient sale in the market, but there is no 
guarantee about the loss. One of the main functions of financial markets specially Capital Market, is 
changing any kind of properties into exchange, and then increasing exchange liquid capability and 
reducing the risks on liquid. Financial markets facilitate cash payment access (YaqubNejad et al., 
2011). Many organizations believe that human forces are considered as competitive advantage and 
the source of producing values (worthiness) in the organization. In this situation, each organization is   1952
responsible for saving its human resources and motivating them to increase utilization at work day by 
day by making use of various mechanisms, including giving rewards as the  most important duty. 
Reward is a presentation of a desirable sequence to an individual in result of his good affair. In order 
to get people to repeat these tasks and increase the repetition possibility everyone has his/her own 
personal interest to this issue depending on one owns' taste or popularity and wealth status.  
2. Literature Review 
Jensen  and  Meckling  (1976)  investigated  the  conflict  between  stockholders  and  managers  and 
reported that managers should be rewarded based on the value created for stockholders, in order to 
reduce agency costs. Reward based on the created value is a sound way to achieve this goal. Lambert 
(1983) studied the Agency theory in the form of long-term contracts. He reported that if the reward 
contract were performed for more than one year, both stockholders and managers would be in a better 
condition. At the end of a period, the manager should be rewarded based on his/her performance 
during the period and also during the previous periods. Consequently, the optimal reward contract 
should  include  the  current  period  and  the  following  year,  in  order to  motivate  the  manager. An 
optimal contract builds the manager's current incentive to the future incentives, but not to the extent 
that the manager commits himself to stay at firm until the due date of contract.  
Murphy (1985)  reported in a study that managers' long-term reward schemes  were  influential  in 
improving corporate performance. He stated that executive directors' resources depend on corporate 
performance  through  stock  adoption,  long-term  performance  schemes,  and  foremost,  stock 
ownership.  Conducting a comprehensive study, he indicated that there was a substantial positive 
relationship between executive managers' reward and performance. In addition, executive managers' 
resources  depended  on  corporate  performance  through  stock  adoption,  long-term  operational 
schemes,  and  foremost,  stock  ownership,  even  if  there  were  no  relationship  between  executive 
managers' reward and performance. Jensen and Murphy (1990) studied the relationship between the 
reward paid to executives and their performance and argued that reward paid to executives was not an 
incentive  to  their  performance.  They,  also,  stated  that  the  managers'  reward  depended  on  their 
performance in public joint stock company. 
Ely (1991) studied the relationship between managerial remuneration and performance evaluation 
factors including stock market return, assets return, return after interest, and tax for various industries, 
and  reported  that  there  was  a  slight  difference  between  different  industries  considering  the 
relationship  between  these  factors  and  corporate  performance.  Amihud  and  Mendelson  (1991) 
reported  that  firms  tend  to  adopt  policies,  which  increase  their  liquidity  of  their  stock,  because 
liquidity could increase the company's return and value. Moreover, they reported that managers could  
increase the liquidity of their companies' stock through changing the firms to a stock joint public 
company, voluntary disclosure, and distribution of stock among the stockholders. Mehran (1995) 
examined the relationship between reward structure paid to executives, ownership, and corporate 
performance. He stated that both QTobin and assets return had a significant positive relationship with 
the  percentage  of  stock  owned  by  managers  and  the  percentage  of  reward  paid  according  to 
ownership. Arora (1996), in different researches, investigated the basis for measuring management 
rewards,  and  argued  that  the  relative  weight  of  using  measuring  tools  in  a  management  reward 
contract could depend on the intrinsic disorder of the performance measuring tools. Darrough et al. 
(1998) concluded that there was a relationship between reward schemes and return manipulation in 
some Japanese firms. Datar et al. (1998) reported that liquidity had an important role in explaining 
cross  sectional  changes  in  stock  returns.  Bolton  and  Thadden  (1998)  stated  that  ownership 
concentration could reduce the number of stockholders willing to trade stock. Maug (1998) studied 
price rise caused by stockholders' monitoring on activities and concluded that firms owning liquidity 
stock could enjoy stronger governance system. Peasnell, et al. (1998) studied the relationship between 
return  management  and  managers'  reward.  They  used  nondiscretionary  accruals  variable  as  a 
representation for return management. They reported that there was a negative significant relationship H. Ghodrati and G. Taghizad / Management Science Letters 4 (2014) 
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between  accruals  increasing  return  and  the  proportion  of  outer  board  of  directors'  members. 
Anderson,  et  al.  (1999)  reported  that  both  cash  reward  and  stock  based  reward  had  a  positive 
correlation with accounting output and market output, but the relative impact of market output on 
stock based reward, compared with accounting output, was much more than its effect on cash reward.  
Sarin et al. (2000) stated in their findings that the difference between the proposed sales and purchase 
price was positively associated with the ownership. Anderson et al. (2000) experimentally stated that 
short-term reward schemes, such as cash rewards, could help managers run firms more appropriately. 
Heflin and Shaw (2000) selected a sample of 260 firms and concluded that there was a positive 
relationship between the percentage of stockholders' block stock and the difference between proposed 
sale  and  purchase  price  of  stock.  They  reported  that  in  firms  that  have  concentrated ownership 
structure, major stockholders had access to private information, and thus trades in which they were 
involved  could  face  the  trading  parties  with  the  adverse  selection  hazard.  Therefore,  both  stock 
parties could increase the sale and purchase price difference to reduce the adverse selection; thereby, 
increasing the price difference of stock sale and purchase, stock trades in market and the liquidity of 
stock market were decreased. Dennis and Weston (2001) stated that there was a negative relationship 
between the sales price difference with both internal ownership and institutional ownership. Jones 
and Sharma (2001) investigated the relationship between return management and free cash flow in 
Australia and in firms with high and low growth. Their results recommended that there was a direct 
substantial relationship between discretionary accruals and free cash flows, in firms with low growth.  
Palmiter (2001) examined management payment and benefits, and stock prices and reported that if 
the  managerial  payments  and  benefits  were  functions  of  stock  prices,  company  value  would be 
increased. Wang (2002) studied the relationship between liquidity and operational performance with 
firm value, comparing Taiwanese and Japanese companies. He used two indicators of assets return 
and stockholders' payment return for corporate performance and concluded that companies looking 
for bold policies in liquidity management, were capable of improving their operational performance, 
and as a result, they could increase their company value. Hartzel and Starks (2003) examined the 
relationship between managers' reward and institutional investment. In this study, they reported that 
even after controlling the firm size, industry type, investment opportunities and performance, there 
was  a  positive  relationship  between  the  institutional  ownership  structure  and  the  amount  of 
performance –based payment, and a negative relationship with the amount of reward. Elayan et al. 
(2003) studied executives' reward scheme and its effect on the performance of 73 firms listed in New 
Zealand  Stock  Exchange  over  the  period  1994-1998.  Their  results  indicated  that  firm  size  and 
business risk were factors influencing on the amount of reward.  
Park and  Shin  (2004) studied the effect  of  board of  directors' reward  on return  management  in 
Canadian firms. Their results indicated that, unlike the outer board of directors, the action of return 
management was first decreased by non – bound board of directors, and then it was decreased more 
by the agency of the board of directors' active institutional stockholders. Mortal and Lipson (2004) 
concluded form their researches that there was a strong relationship between liquidity and capital 
structure-related  decisions,  and  also,  increasing  the  liquidity  could  raise  the  amount  of  stock 
distribution. Greg, et al. (2005) investigated the relationship between managerial cash reward and 
corporate performance for a large sample of English companies over the period 1994-2002. Their 
results  indicated  that,  in  general,  there  was  a  weak  relationship  between  cash  rewards  and 
performance. Chung, et al. (2005) studied the relationship between return management and free cash 
flow in firms with low growth and reported that there was a significant direct relationship between 
mentioned variables.  
Philippon (2006) examined the relationship between managerial incentives and return management 
and reported that during the  years when the amount of discretionary accruals were increased, the 
managers had sold assets to achieve the desired level of return. Kato and Kubo (2006) evaluated the 
corporate performance for 10  years (19861995)  based on accounting  standards and reported that   1954
Japanese managers' cash reward was sensitive to corporate performance. Rubin (2007) found that the 
amount of ownership was an index for trading activities, and ownership concentration was an index 
for distort switching and asymmetric information. Osma and Noguer (2007) studied the role of board 
of directors' reward and having a monitoring committee for the board of directors on limiting return 
management in some Spanish firms and reported that return manipulation was set through board of 
directors' reward, significantly. Agarwal (2007) investigated the relationship between liquidity and 
institutional ownership using adverse selection approach and information efficiency and concluded 
that there was a nonlinear relationship between them. Lesmond et al. (2008) conducted a research 
study on capital structure and stock liquidity and reported that using debts could lead to a reduction in 
stock liquidity. Bharath et al. (2009) investigated the relationship between capital structure and stock 
liquidity. They reported that firms with higher debt financing, had lower stock liquidity. Shah, et al. 
(2009)  studied  the  relationship  between  board  of  directors'  reward  and  return  management  and 
reported a negative relationship between institutional ownership and return management. 
Fang  et  al.  (2009)  reported  on  the  positive  relationship  between  stock  liquidity  and  corporate 
performance,  using  feedback  theory.  Quito  (2009)  studied  the  relationship  between  ownership 
structure and market liquidity in Brazil and Chile and concluded that the owners of large stock blocks 
were the reason for the reduction of accessibility to floated stock in market, and consequently, the 
reduction  of  market  liquidity.  Chung  et  al.  (2010)  examined  corporation  strategic  effects  and 
ownership structure on liquidity and found that institutional owners had created more liquidity. Tariq 
(2010)  studied  the  relationship  between  the  reward  paid  to  executive  director  and  corporate 
performance in 30 large Swedish firms over the period 2004-2008. They reported that there was a 
significant negative relationship between the payment and performance. Pereira and Zhang (2010) 
investigated  the  relationship  between  stock  returns  and  liquidity  fluctuation  and  reported  that 
investors could benefit from the fluctuations, around the average of liquidity, and this benefit was 
decreased with the increase in the fluctuations range of liquidity. Bharath et al. (2011) studied the 
percentage of reward paid to five senior managers and corporate performance in the  USA. They 
found that the higher percentage of reward paid to 5 senior managers leads to a lower QTobin ratio 
(weaker  performance).    Lang,  et  al.  (2012)  studied  the  relationship  between  transparency  and 
liquidity and reported that the firms having more transparency had lower transaction costs and more 
liquidity. ZareStahriji (2002) investigated the factors influencing the capability of stock liquidity on 
Tehran Stock Exchange and concluded that in Tehran Stock Exchange and among the active firms, 
the capability of stock liquidity was associated with the amount of stock trading. Khoshtinat, et al. 
(2003) investigated the relationship between return management and managerial reward and reported 
that managers tend to practice return management in the periods of return and loss to increase their 
reward.  Khani  (2003)  performed  similar  study  on  investigating  the  relationship  between  return 
management and managerial reward and reported that the method of paying reward to managers in 
Iran, was usually based on annual return. Namazi and Moradi (2004) investigated factors influencing 
on determining board of directors' reward using the information from Tehran Stock Exchange over 
the period 1999 – 2003. The reported that there was a significant relationship between assets return 
ratio  and  its  changes,  firm  size,  ownership  concentration,  financial  risk  with  board  of  directors' 
reward  in  all  companies.  Namazi  and  Sirani (2004)  studied  the  relationship between  managerial 
rewards in Iranian companies and accounting return, return growth, and the market value growth, and 
investigated important factors in determining the reward of executive directors. They found that the 
longer and more stable the duration of contract, the more value for the company. 
Poor Haidari and Hemati (2004) studied debt contracts, political costs, reward schemes, and return 
management ownership, and concluded that there was not any relationship between reward schemes 
and  return  management.  Zarea  (2007)  concluded  that  shares  liquid  at  first  step  had  a  close 
relationship with transactions volume and secondly with company value. Baqeri Mehmandusti (2007) 
conducted a research on evaluating the relation between shares liquid and decisions about investment 
structure  of  accepted  companies  in  Tehran  Exchange  market.  They  reported  that  there  was  a 
relationship between shares liquid and capital structure. Risk of lack of shares liquid had a positive H. Ghodrati and G. Taghizad / Management Science Letters 4 (2014) 
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significant relationship with firms’ ratio and increasing their lack of companies' shares' liquid led 
managers to make use of more debts to meet their own activities financially during the recent years. 
Mehrani and Baqeri (2009) dealt with the effects of institutional shareholders and free cash flows on 
profit  management  in  Tehran  exchange  market.  The  reported  that  there  was  a  direct  significant 
relation between profit management great free cash flows among companies with slight. Tehrani and 
Aabi (2009) conducted a research on portfolio output and function of investing companies with liquid 
ability ranking and their results indicated liquid ability ranking could influence on the operation of 
investing companies based on sharp index throughout all steps of the research and also profitability 
ratios. Sajadi and Mehrizi (2010) evaluated the relationship between schemes of managers' rewards 
and economic criteria for operation assessment. Rahmani et al. (2010) evaluated sharers liquid ability 
and institutional ownership relation in Iran. In order to separate the effect of institutional owners' 
various operations on sharers' liquid ability, they used these two criteria, institutional ownership rate 
(scale) and concentration. They reported that there was a positive and significant relationship between 
institutional ownership and sharers' liquid ability and institutional ownership Centrality. Karami et al. 
(2010) reported that there was a significant and positive relation between economic values added and 
exchange  market  liquid  while  strong  and  significant  correlation  between  variables  and  company 
emphasizes  their  interaction  to  each  other  on  some  firms  listed  on  Tehran  Stock  Exchange. 
MoradzadeFard et al. (2010) dealt with the role of onus items management on shares liquidity of 
accepted companies in Tehran exchange market. They reported that onus items management had a 
negative and significant influence on companies' shares liquid so that profit management led rather in 
information asymmetry and increased transactional costs. Izadinia and Rasaian (2010) investigated 
the relationship between ownership dispersion and stock liquidity. They reported that there was no 
significant relationship between ownership dispersion and stock liquidity in Tehran Stock Exchange. 
Hosseini (2010) performed a study on relationship between corporate performance and stock market 
liquidity and reported that there was a strong significant relationship between liquidity factors and 
corporate performance. YaqubNejad et al. (2011) studied the impact of corporation strategic system 
on stock liquidity in Tehran Stock Exchange. They reported that there was a positive significant 
relationship between non bound members of board of directors and stock liquidity; and there was a 
negative significant relationship between ownership centralization and simultaneous tenure of two 
positions of board of director's chairman and executive manager and stock liquidity. JavadBalenga 
(2012) studied the impact of ownership structure on the relationship between managerial reward and 
performance. They reported that ownership centralization had a positive significant impact on the 
relationship between managerial reward and corporate performance. Roodgar (2012) compared the 
capability of stock liquidity in Tehran Stock Exchange during different periods, using a paired test. 
Mohseni et al. (2012) investigated the effect of board of directors' reward on company performance 
on 140 listed companies in TSE over the period 2008- 2011 and concluded that there was a negative 
significant relationship between the amount of board of directors' and corporation performance with 
the error level of less than 10%. 
3. Research Hypothesis 
The main hypothesis of the survey investigates that there was a relationship between stock liquidity 
with reward of director's board. There are also some sub-hypotheses as follows,  
1) There is a relationship between Q-Tobin ratios with reward of director's board. 
2) There is a relationship between Return on Assets (ROA) with reward of director's board. 
3) There is a relationship between operational cash flow with reward of director's board. 
4) There is a relationship between Return on Equity (ROE) with reward of director's board. 
 
4. Research Methodology 
The statistical community consists of corporations accepted in Tehran Stock Exchange but it does not 
consist of financial intermediaries. The selected corporations should not have any trading interruption 
for more than three months and their fiscal year should not have been changed. To state the sample   1956
size, the general Cochran formula was used, so considering this formula and using random sampling 
method, 136 corporations were selected as sample size of this research. The financial of these firms 
was studied for 2007-2011 financial years. Therefore, the statistical community consists 680 year-
firms. The research general relationship is stated as this formula:  
  =     ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,,    
where   is reward of director's board as dependent variable,	    	  	are share liquidity, Q-Tobin ratio, 
Return On Assets(ROA), operational cash flow, Return On Equity (ROE), changes of ROA, changes 
of operational cash flow, changes of ROE, firm size, as in-dependent variables, respectively. The 
relationship  between  these  variables  were  estimated  with  multi-variables  linear-regression  as 
following: 
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The variables of this relation is computed as following: 
 
 = reward of director's board = amount of director's board reward 
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5. The results  
 
The  historical  data  about  Iranian  corporation  were  collected  and  statistical  calculations  were 
computed. In this research 136 Iranian corporations were selected as random sample and was studied 
their financial performances during 2007-2011 five-year period. Summarize of description variables 
was as Table 1.  
 
Table 1  
The summary of descriptive Indices 
year  Index  EC  LIQ  Q-Tobin  ROA  CFO  ROE  T_ROA  T_CFO  T_ROE  Size 
2007 
Mean  3.60  145.41  1.56  0.16  0.17  21.26  0.18  0.58  2.74  12.86 
Medium  5.60  146.50  1.35  0.14  0.16  7.76  -  -0.08  -0.90  12.68 
Mode  -  1.00  1.06  0.10  0.16  -79.52  -0.07  -0.29  -1.18  11.99 
St. Deviation  3.18  81.80  0.75  0.11  0.13  60.82  1.10  6.88  44.13  1.40 
Minimum  -  1.00  0.67  -0.04  -0.38  -79.52  -4.91  -11.47  -109.39  9.31 
Maximum  7.60  286.00  5.78  0.52  0.65  351.47  6.25  76.46  485.24  17.78 
2008 
Mean  3.55  103.19  1.36  0.14  0.16  1.28  -0.49  1.99  -2.11  12.98 
Medium  5.70  101.50  1.23  0.13  0.14  0.14  -0.10  0.16-  -1.01  12.86 
Mode  -  -  1.00  .04  0.07  -74.36  -  -.37  -1.20  12.52 
St. Deviation  3.30  86.44  0.54  0.11  0.12  32.54  5.90  18.75  8.50  1.39 
Minimum  -  -  0.67  -0.17  -0.11  -74.36  -64.13  -23.06  -59.77  9.16 
Maximum  8.30  258.00  4.52  0.57  0.63  108.13  19.27  211.55  28.19  17.98 
2009 
Mean  1.41  144.65  1.26  0.12  0.14  56.77  -0.44  0.38  -2.04  13.04 
Medium  -  153.50  1.18  0.10  0.13  31.08  -0.08  -0.13  -1.40  12.98 
Mode  -  -  0.91  0.05  .07  -41.27  -0.21  -.16  -1.40  13.08 
St. Deviation  2.66  89.81  0.41  0.10  0.14  111.69  3.64  2.73  17.52  1.43 
Minimum  -  -  0.64  -0.20  -0.15  -41.27  -40.11  -4.51  -157.39  9.16 
Maximum  7.30  294.00  3.44  0.55  0.65  734.14  4.13  20.17  81.52  18.24 
2010 
Mean  4.48  169.14  1.36  0.12  0.14  51.41  0.64  0.75  3.12  13.19 
Medium  6.20  178.50  1.24  0.11  0.12  37.28  -0.08  -0.18  -0.50  13.10 
Mode  -  -  1.24  0.14  0.11  15.88  0.03  -.23  -0.29  12.98 
St. Deviation  3.18  90.08  0.49  0.11  0.14  57.28  6.94  5.84  54.14  1.42 
Minimum  -  -  0.76  -0.17  -0.22  -46.77  -79.89  -15.04  -143.88  9.89 
Maximum  8.50  322.00  3.33  0.43  0.58  271.41  3.08  49.27  600.73  18.41 
2011 
Mean  4.93  195.78  1.41  0.11  0.13  22.90  -4.56  -1.42  -1.62  13.32 
Medium  6.30  206.50  1.28  0.10  0.12  9.07  -0.12  -0.15  -0.85  13.22 
Mode  -  2.00  1.00  .07  .11  -57.94  -0.27  -0.12  -1.20  12.83 
St. Deviation  3.02  94.31  0.52  0.12  0.11  61.44  57.14  15.34  10.18  1.48 
Minimum  -  2.00  0.76  -.17  -.28  -57.94  -663.64  -177.12  -96.19  9.80 
Maximum  8.30  350.00  3.39  0.62  0.49  452.12  53.79  12.40  23.04  18.49 H. Ghodrati and G. Taghizad / Management Science Letters 4 (2014) 
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Table 1 shows the mean (average), Medium, Mode, standard deviation, Minimum and Maximum 
based on each financial year for all of variables. The multi-variables linear-regression was used for 
determination of the relationship between dependent and in-dependents variables. Before applying 
this  method,  the  preliminaries  of  regression  were  evaluated.  These  preliminaries  are  variables 
normality, dependence of dependents variables etc. Table 2 demonstrates the results of Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test  and the results indicate that all components were normally distributed. In addition, 
Pearson correlation analysis was used for determination of the variables independency. Table 3 shows 
summarize of Pearson correlation analysis. 
 
Table 2    
Normality variables Test after Normalization   
Result  year   EC   LIQ   Q-Tobin   ROA   CFO   RS   Size  
Kolmogorov's z  2007   1.47   0.84   0 .82   1.35   1.26   1.73   1.12  
Sig. level  0.06    0.481   0. 3 0 0   0.052   0.083   0.062   0.162  
Kolmogorov's z  2008   1.468   1.505   0.535   1.175   1.101   0.989   1.26  
Sig. level  0.075    0.216   0.180   0.127   0.177   0.282   0.083  
Kolmogorov's z  2009   1.604   0.964   0.476   1.468   0.998   2.677   1.155  
Sig. level  0.055    0.31 0   0.2 50   0. 268   0.272   0.0 67   0.138  
Kolmogorov's z  2010   1.379   0.776   0.881   1.372   1.181   1.33   1.289  
Sig. level  0.089    0.584   0.200   0.056   0.123   0.058   0.072  
Kolmogorov's z  2011    1.24   1.079   0.852    1.325   0.891   0.742   1.288  
Sig. level  0.098    0.195   0.210   0.06 0   0.406   0.182   0.072  
  
Table 3  
Pearson Correlation for variables  
Variable    X1  X2  X3  X4  X5  X6  X7  X8  X9 
X1  1                          
X2 
Sig. 
0.153   
0.000    1                        
X3 
Sig. 
0.231   
0.000   
0.145   
0    1                     
X4 
Sig. 
0.213  
0.000   
0.118   
0.000   
0.158   
0.000    1                  
X5 
Sig. 
0.119  
0.072   
0.219   
0   
0.311   
0.000   
0.095   
0.000    1               
X6 
Sig. 
0.089  
0.000   
0.271   
0.000   
0.114   
0.000   
0.116   
0.000   
0.156   
0    1            
X7 
Sig. 
0.318  
0.000   
0.198   
0.000   
0.312   
0.000   
0.068   
0.000   
0.075   
0.0000   
0.194   
00.000    1         
X8 
Sig. 
0.127  
0.000   
0.123   
00.000   
0.186   
0.005   
0.031   
0.002   
0.164   
0.009   
0.079   
0.001   
0.021   
0.003    1      
X9  
Sig.  
0.071  
0.004   
0.091   
0.007   
0.027   
0.000   
0.217   
0.005   
0.101   
0.001   
0.059   
0.002   
0.068   
0.009   
0.271   
0.009    1   
 
The correlation coefficients shown in Table 3 for all variables are generally less than 0.5 and then 
there is a week linear relation between in-dependents variable. As we stated earlier, some of linear-
regression preliminaries such as; normality of variables distribution and linear independency of in-
dependents variables were accepted. Furthermore, based on previous research methodology, multi-
variables linear-regression was used for variables relation analysis. This analysis was used for each 
financial year. Table 4 shows the summary of regression estimation parameters. Table 4 showed the 
constant parameter and slope of each variable that estimated with multi-variables linear-regression. In 
each row of this table was written the estimation results for each performance year. By substituting 
these parameters on variables relation, the relation between of variables are as Table 5: 
Table 4   
Multi-variables Linear-regression Parameters  
R
2  LIQ  Q-Tobin  ROA  CFO  ROE  T_ROA  T_CFO  T_ROE  Size  Constant  Year 
0.235    0.024    0.042    0.124    0.163    0.440    0.825    0.949    0.988    0.540    5.325    2007   
0.341    0.422    -.009    -0.048    -0.330    0.004    0.506    0.666    0.374    0.002    6.581    2008   
0.256    0.045    0.086    0.129    0.212    0.547    0.878    0.904    0.436    0.690    5.054    2009   
0.375    0.085    -0.024    0.024    -0.015    0.002    0.134    1.607    0.081    0.003    1.351    2010   
0.215    0.034    0.052    0.121    0.239    0.477    0.753    0.302    0.631    0.571    50249    2011     1958
 According to the results of Table 4, there is a direct relationship between firm sizes with reward of 
board's directors. In addition, there is a direct relationship between changes of Return on Equity with 
reward of board's directors. Moreover, there is a direct relationship between changes of operational 
cash flow with reward of board's directors. There is also a direct relation between changes of Return 
on Equity with reward of board's directors, a direct relationship between Return on Equity with 
reward of board's directors, a direct relation between operational cash flow with reward of board's 
directors and a direct relation between changes of Return on Equity with reward of board's directors  
but the relation was reverse for 2008 and 2010. Finally, there is a direct relation between changes of 
Q-Tobin ratio with reward of board's directors but the relationship was reverse for 2008 and 2010. 
There is also a direct relation between Assets Flow ratios with reward of board's directors. Table 5 
demonstrates the summary of Fisher test for different years. Based on Fisher tests results for linear-
regression  estimations,  all of  significance  are  less  than  five present. Therefore, at  95 percent of 
confidence level, zero hypotheses for all of relations variables are rejected. There is a weak linear 
relation between performances variables with reward of director's board.  
Table 5 
The summary of Fisher test   
2011  2010  2009  2008  2007  Year 
215.21  114.23  87.124  98.854  75.315  F-Statistic 
0.000  0.000  0.001  0.004  0.002  Sig. level 
  
6. Conclusion  
We have presented an empirical investigation to study the relationship between the reward of board 
of directors and some financial factors on selected firms on Tehran Stock Exchange. The study has 
applied stepwise linear regression test and concluded that rewarding board of directors had mostly 
positive and meaningful relationship with firm size, ROE, ROA, cash flow, Tubin-Q, etc.  
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